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Abstract
This paper investigates the merger wave hypothesis for the US and the UK employing a Markov
regime-switching model. Using quarterly data covering the last 30 years, for the US, we identify the
beginning of a merger wave in the mid 1990s but not the much-discussed 1980s merger wave. We argue
that the latter finding can be ascribed to the refined methods of inference offered by the Gibbs sampling
approach. As opposed to the US, mergers in the UK exhibit multiple waves, with activity surging in the
early 1970s and the late 1980s.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the merger wave hypothesis for the US and the UK employing a Markov regime switching model. Using
quarterly data covering the last thirty years, for the US, we identify the beginning of a merger wave in the mid 1990s but not the
much-discussed 1980s merger wave. We argue that the latter finding can be ascribed to the refined methods of inference oﬀered by
the Gibbs sampling approach. As opposed to the US, mergers in the UK exhibit multiple waves, with activity surging in the early
1970s and the late 1980s.
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1. Introduction
There is broad consensus that mergers occur in waves. Since
the seminal contribution by Nelson (1959), many studies have
reported a wave-like pattern in merger activity, pointing out the
merger waves of the mid 1980s and mid 1990s in the US in
particular.1 Guided by these observations, a vast empirical lit-
erature has sought to identify potential causes and triggers for
merger waves.2 This empirical strand has more recently been
complemented by eﬀorts to explain the phenomenon of merger
waves in the theoretical literature.
While the general notion of mergers occurring in waves is
practically undisputed, there is no clear consensus on how to
operationalize the concept of a ‘merger wave’ in a time se-
ries context. The empirical literature has put forward three dis-
tinct approaches to modeling and identifying such waves. First,
Golbe and White (1993) have sought to identify waves by fitting
a sine curve to historic merger data. Second, merger series have
been modeled by autoregressive processes capable of producing
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1Studies discussing the 1980s merger wave include Ravenscraft (1987),
Golbe and White (1988, 1993), and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). Mueller
(1997), Andrade et al. (2001), and Harford (2005) describe the 1990s merger
wave. An extensive review of earlier merger waves is provided in Scherer and
Ross (1990, pp. 154–159).
2See e.g. Ravenscraft (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2001). Gugler et al. (2005) examine hypotheses that have been put
forward as explanations of merger waves.
wave-like behavior (Shughart and Tollison, 1984; Clark et al.,
1988; Chowdhury, 1993; Barkoulas et al., 2001). Third, and fi-
nally, merger series have been modeled by means of parameter-
switching models where waves in activity are caused by discrete
parameter switches (Town, 1992; Linn and Zhu, 1997).
This paper reexamines the case for detecting waves in merger
activity in a time series context using more recent, consistent
data and refined estimation techniques. Following Town (1992)
and Linn and Zhu (1997), we employ a Markov regime switch-
ing model to describe the stochastic behavior of merger activity.
We provide a thorough motivation for this approach, starting
from Nelson’s (1959, p. 126) observation that aggregate merger
series are characterized by “large bursts of activity separated by
lengthy intervals of very low activity,” which we take to suggest
the presence of two distinct unobserved states of merger activ-
ity, ‘high’ and ‘low’. By letting mean and variance of the au-
toregressive model be determined by realizations of the Markov
process governing the evolution of the two states, waves are
triggered by switches in the unobserved state. While this ap-
proach borrows from Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997),
we propose a slightly modified formal specification in which
the autoregressive processes’ inertia persists also across state
switches, leading merger activity to react less abruptly to such
switches. More importantly, we use new and consistent quar-
terly time series data covering merger activity both in the US
and the UK, extending from 1973:IV through 2003:IV and from
1969:I through 2003:IV, respectively.3
In this paper, we challenge the notion of the much-discussed
1980s merger wave in the US. We argue that the discrepancy
between our findings and previous econometric identifications
of this wave is driven by a further distinguishing feature of our
3Previous empirical studies examined the merger wave hypothesis using an
assemblage of separate series diﬀering in coverage and inclusion criteria. For
a general discussion of available historical time series merger data and their
limitations, see e.g. Golbe and White (1988).
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analysis: the use of more recent estimation techniques. To ad-
dress the central issue of wave identification, we conduct infer-
ence on the regime indicator within a Bayesian framework em-
ploying Gibbs sampling techniques (Gelfand and Smith, 1990;
Albert and Chib, 1993). In contrast, the aforementioned studies
by Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) base wave identi-
fication on Maximum Likelihood techniques (Hamilton, 1989,
1993). In this latter approach, inference consists in first esti-
mating the model’s unknown parameters via Maximum Like-
lihood, and then conducting inference on the unobserved state
conditional on the parameter estimates. Bayesian analysis, on
the other hand, avoids this two-step procedure by treating both
the model parameters and state variable as random variables
and basing inference on states on a joint distribution of param-
eters and states rather than on a conditional distribution. This
methodological diﬀerence can lead to quite diﬀerent conclu-
sions regarding the likely path of the unobserved regime indi-
cator if parameter uncertainty is suﬃciently high, as the uncer-
tainty on parameter estimates does not feed into uncertainty on
states when employing a two-step estimation procedure. Our
main results are as follows. First, we find that the US has wit-
nessed only the beginning of a wave in merger activity, this
wave starting in 1995:IV. This result is consistent with the ob-
servations in Mueller (1997), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001),
and Andrade et al. (2001), all of which report an upsurge in
merger activity in the mid 1990s. However, our investigation of
industry level data does not support the prominent notion that
waves in aggregate merger activity represent the clustering of
surges within one or a few industries (Mitchell and Mulherin,
1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001; Har-
ford, 2005). Second, even when fitting the model only to the
data prior to the estimated break date, we fail to identify the
much discussed 1980s merger wave. To explain our diﬀerence
in findings, we argue that if there is suﬃcient uncertainty sur-
rounding the model’s parameters, then the two-step Maximum
Likelihood estimation procedure can convey a deceptive degree
of certainty about state inference. Third, the UK has witnessed
two merger waves, the first starting in 1971:I and ending in
1973:IV and the second lasting from 1986:III to 1989:IV. The
dating of these merger waves is close to the evidence reported
in Hughes (1993, p. 16).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives a short overview of theoretical explanations of merger
waves. Section 3 briefly comments on the data employed for
our empirical study, section 4 provides a thorough motivation
the model used. In Section 5, we describe the inference problem
and give a brief introduction to the Gibbs sampling approach.
Section 6 presents the main results of our estimation both for
the US and the UK series. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Explanations of Merger Waves: An Overview
This section reviews some of the the theoretical explana-
tions for merger waves.4 The two main lines of reasoning are
4Interestingly, the literature focuses entirely on explanations for merger
waves at the industry level. A notable exception is Toxvaerd (2008), whose
the following: First, contributions from the field of industrial
organization typically identify reasons for strategic complemen-
tarities between (otherwise independent) merger decisions. By
these complementarities, a merger between any two firms makes
it more attractive for other firms to merge, so that a single merger
may trigger a wave. Second, contributions from financial eco-
nomics typically point out that merger waves may represent a
simultaneous reaction of firms to exogenous changes in the eco-
nomic environment.
More specifically, models put forward in the industrial or-
ganization literature typically explain merger waves as the se-
quentially rational equilibrium outcome of a game involving a
series of merger decision. For instance, Nilsson and Sørgard
(1998) consider a two-stage model in which two pairs of firms
sequentially decide whether or not to merge before engaging
in product market competition. Firms contemplating the first
merger take into account whether their decision encourages or
discourages the second merger, and how this merger will aﬀect
their profits. In equilibrium, a merger wave is triggered if the
incentives are such that the first merger profitably induces the
second.
In a closely related paper, Faulı´-Oller (2000) investigates
the potential for strategic merger waves using a model in which
two low-cost firms sequentially bid for high-cost firms before
product market interaction. He finds that, for certain sets of
parameter values (reflecting cost diﬀerences and market size),
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that the first bid-
der finds it profitable to trigger a takeover wave. The intu-
ition for this result is that the first firm can exploit competition
among the larger number of competitors, so the compensation
required to induce the first merger is lower than for the subse-
quent merger. However, as the merger increases industry prof-
its, the second firm finds it profitable to acquire the remaining
low-cost firm although the compensation is higher.
In a more recent contribution, Qiu and Zhou (2007) model
merger waves in a more elaborate game involving multiple rounds
of negotiation before firms eventually interact in the product
market. In each round, a randomly drawn firm gets to bid for a
target firm of its choice.5 The authors show that, for some range
of parameter values (again, reflecting market size and costs) the
equilibrium outcome involves a series of mergers. The intuition
for their result is again that individual mergers induce further
strategic mergers that would otherwise not occur, allowing early
merging firms to free-ride on the subsequent price increase.
Toxvaerd (2008) proposes an alternative explanation of merger
waves employing a dynamic model where the value of being
merged remains subject to random fluctuations in the exoge-
nous economic environment (mirroring for instance technology
or demand shocks). He assumes that a set of acquirers compete
over time for scarce targets and that each acquirer has the op-
tion of buying one target, so the issue is whether to postpone
an acquisition or raid the target immediately. It turns out that
if the realization of the economic fundamental lies above some
model can be reinterpreted as a model of aggregate merger activity.
5The merger game ends either if a target rejects a proposal or if all drawn
firms refrain from exerting the option to propose a merger.
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cut-oﬀ level at which the value from raiding is non-negative, the
equilibrium outcome is that all potential acquiring firms raid the
target firms simultaneously.6 Intuitively, it is the risk of being
stranded without a firm to merge that triggers the preemptive
merger wave.
While theory oﬀers insight concerning horizontal merger
activity, the literature is scant on the phenomenon of merger
waves in vertically related industries. A notable exception is
Avenel (2008), who considers a successive Bertrand oligopoly
model where firms decide on (pairwise) vertical integration and
the adoption of a cost-reducing technology before product mar-
ket competition takes place. He shows that, depending on the
fixed cost associated with the introduction of the new technol-
ogy, any degree of vertical integration can arise in equilibrium.
The intuition for this finding is that the integration and the adop-
tion of the new technology lowers the profitability of integration
of other firms; so if the fixed costs are low enough, vertical in-
tegration will go on until the industry is fully integrated.
In contrast to the industrial organization literature, where
the focus is on how one merger is related to the other through
the strategic interaction on the product market, the financial
economics literature studies the incentives to merge due to ex-
ogenous changes in the stock market valuation of capital, or
firms. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) treat mergers as realloca-
tions of used capital, and provide a model of merger waves that
is based on technological change and Tobin’s q-theory.7 They
assume that a firm’s output is given as a function of its capi-
tal stock and its random state of technology, and they assume
further that a firm has the opportunity to sell or buy capital in
the market for used capital. The authors then calculate, condi-
tional on the state of technology, the market value of one unit
of capital within the firm and compare it to the price at which
used capital trades. Depending on this value gap, firms either
sell or buy bundled capital (that is, mergers take place), and do
so increasingly if the interfirm dispersion of capital values gets
larger (merger waves as “reallocation waves”).8
The papers by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004) depart from the neoclassical perspec-
tive and show that merger waves can solely occur because of
valuation issues. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) posit that financial
markets are ineﬃcient in the short-run and consider a model
of acquisitions where the firms are valued incorrectly due to
(market-wide) “investor sentiment”. Given market beliefs of
firm values and the perceived synergy of the merger, they study
the long-term wealth eﬀects of an acquisition on the merging
parties’ shareholders. They arrive at the conclusion that rising
stock market valuations trigger a merger wave where relatively
overvalued firms acquire their targets for stock (the choice of
6Albeit in a dynamic model, the equilibrium outcome is similar to those in
Faulı´-Oller (2000) and Qiu and Zhou (2007), where an exogenous realization
of low demand may trigger a merger wave.
7Faria (2008) interprets Tobin’s q as a measure of managerial ability and
considers mergers as a way to transfer organizational capital from firms with
low managerial skills to firms with high managerial skills.
8Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) build on the notion of reallocation waves
and shows that exits and mergers should rise after a technological shock, and
that exits should lead to mergers.
making the acquisition for stock instead of cash allows bidding
shareholders to redistribute wealth away from the target share-
holders to themselves).
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) diﬀers from the pre-
vious paper by explicitly taking into account the competition
among bidders for an acquisition target. The authors consider
a sequence of potential acquisitions and model the mergers as
second-price auctions with equity bids (the crucial assumption
is that the bidding firms do not know the value of the target due
to both market-wide and firm-specific misvaluation). In this
setting, a merger wave is defined as a sequence of two or more
time periods in which the probability of a merger occurring is
above the unconditional expected probability of a merger. One
of the model’s main implications is that a large enough real-
ization of the market-wide misvaluation can trigger a merger
wave. Intuitively, the wave phenomenon results if the market is
unable to fully self-correct and stays overvalued after a shock,
which in turn triggers the merger in the consecutive period.
3. The Data
Our paper follows the majority of previous empirical stud-
ies, particularly Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997), in using
the number of transactions as the measure of historical merger
activity.9 Specifically, we investigate the following series:
1. The US merger series, covering 1973:I–2003:IV. The time
series data are taken from various issues of Mergerstat Re-
view, a publication by FactSet Mergerstat LLC. The series
reports publicly announced mergers, acquisitions and unit
divestitures involving (i) at least one US company, (ii) a
transaction volume exceeding $1 million, and (iii) a pur-
chase price exceeding 10% of the acquired company’s eq-
uity (i.e., an interest exceeding 10% of the acquired firm’s
equity).
2. The UK merger series, covering 1969:I–2003:IV. These data
are published by the Oﬃce for National Statistics on a quar-
terly basis. The series consists of publicly announced merg-
ers and acquisitions involving UK companies only. In con-
trast to the US data, there is no explicit cut-oﬀ bias relating
to the value of the transaction, but the deal has to aim at gain-
ing de jure control of the acquired company (i.e., a control-
ling interest exceeding 50% of the acquired firm’s equity).
Plots of these series are presented in Figure 1.
4. A Markov-Switching Model of Merger Waves
As outlined above, the literature has advanced the idea that
mergers follow a wave pattern. We take this casual impression
9Other prominent measures of merger activity suggested in the literature
are the dollar value of merger transactions (see e.g. Golbe and White, 1988,
Scherer and Ross (1990) and the number of transactions relative to appropriate
population totals (see e.g. Hughes, 1993, p. 16; Gugler et al., 2005).
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Figure 1: The Number of Merger Transactions, US Series, 1973:I–2003:IV (in
Top Panel) and UK Series, 1969:I–2003:IV (Bottom Panel).
to suggest the presence of two distinct states of merger activity,
high and low, as follows:10
Assumption 1. Each period t is associated with an unobserved
latent state variable S t ∈ {1, 2}, where S t = 1 implies that
period t is a low-activity period and S t = 2 denotes a high-
activity period.
The basic idea is then to let unobserved switches between
states of high and low activity feed into observed merger activity—
in a sense to be made precise shortly—so as to induce the al-
leged wave-like behavior. Hence, given Assumption 1, the re-
maining key questions concerning our description of mergers
are: (1) What determines the unobservable state S t in any pe-
riod t, and (2) how exactly do the unobservable states feed into
observed merger activity yt?
The general framework in which we deal with these ques-
tions is the Markov regime switching model originally proposed
by Hamilton (1989). In a nutshell, this approach treats both the
sequence of observations yt and the sequence of states S t as (in-
terdependent) random variables, specifies a model which jointly
generates the two sequences, and then estimates the model us-
ing the observed series yt while treating the sequence of states
as ‘missing data’. This framework oﬀers several advantages
over more traditional approaches to break-point analysis which
typically rely on casual determination of candidate break-dates
or ad hoc restrictions on the number of break dates (see e.g.
Chow, 1960, 1984; Andrews, 1993): First and foremost, a ma-
jor goal of our analysis is not only the estimation of regime-
dependent structural model parameters, but dating the waves
(i.e. conducting inference on the break dates themselves). This
10We shall comment on the idea of using more than two states when dis-
cussing our estimation results further below. Let us just note for now that raising
the number of attainable states invokes the usual trade-oﬀ between achieving a
better fit to the data and overparameterizing the model. As a consequence, we
suggest using the minimal number of states capable of producing the described
behavior in mergers.
in turn requires modeling the probability law governing changes
in regime rather than imposing particular break-dates a priori.
Through the probability model, we can then let the data itself
speak about the likely incidence of significant changes. Second,
we would like to propose a unified structural process capable of
describing various merger series (such as across countries or
industries) with apparently diﬀerent frequency and timing of
waves, which requires that wave dates be determined endoge-
nously by the process.
More specifically, concerning the determination of states,
we shall assume that states follow an independent first-order
Markov process. Thus, in any period t, the probability of switch-
ing to a certain state in the next period t+1 depends only on the
state in period t. Specifically, we assume the following:
Assumption 2. The unobserved state variable S t follows a first-
order Markov process with transition probabilities from any pe-
riod t to period t + 1 given by
Pr(S t+1 = 1|S t = 1) = p11, and Pr(S t+1 = 2|S t = 2) = p22, (1)
with p11, p22 ∈ [0, 1]. In any period t, these transition probabil-
ities are independent of past (log) merger realizations (yt, yt−1, . . .).
It is important to note that ‘discrete merger waves’ as we
understand and model them need not display a highly regular
periodic pattern. Indeed, the first-order Markov specification
implies that the process governing the states displays very lit-
tle memory. This low-memory approach seems justified by the
aforementioned literature giving little impression that the docu-
mented bursts of high activity display a highly regular periodic
pattern.11 Some structure is of course nonetheless implied by
our Markov specification, such as the expected duration of a
high state being p22/(1 − p22) and the expected duration of a
low state being p11/(1− p11), but these durations generally dis-
play a rather high variability. Furthermore, due to the first order
Markov property, the remaining expected duration of a certain
state is independent of how long the process has already been
in that state, which again reflects the low-memory quality of the
process.
Finally, note that the Markovian model encompasses the ex-
treme possibility of a state being ‘absorbing’ in the sense that,
once the process reaches a certain state, it remains in that state
indefinitely (so that the regime switch is permanent rather than
transitory). This is the case for the low-activity state if p11 = 1
and for the high-activity state if p22 = 1. Conversely, when-
ever this is not the case, so p11, p22 < 1 and if in addition
p11+p22 > 0 (so there is no completely deterministic alternation
between states), then the Markov chain turns out to be ergodic
(see e.g. Hamilton, 1989). Then, a further key characteristic of
the state switching model is given by the ergodic regime prob-
abilities Pr(S t = i), i.e. the unconditional probability of state
11Although Golbe and White (1993) do report evidence of a sine wave pat-
tern in US merger activity based on data up to 1989, by inspection of the plots
in Figure 1 we strongly suspect that their model would no longer provide a very
good fit to our more recent series.
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i ∈ {1, 2}.12 These can be shown to be given by Pr(S t = 1) =
(1 − p11)/(2 − p11 − p22) and Pr(S t = 2) = 1 − Pr(S t = 1).
Let us now turn to the second question concerning the exact
form of the state’s impact on merger activity. We start from the
idea that merger activity follows some sort of mean reverting
autoregressive process and augment this by assuming that both
the mean and the variance of this process are time-varying and
dependent on the states.13 Specifically, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 3. Conditional on the sequence of unobserved states
S t, (log) mergers yt follow the AR(k) process
yt − μS t =
k∑
i=1
φi(yt−i − μS t ) + εt, (2)
where (i) the εt are independently N(0, σ2S t ) and independent of
previous merger realizations (yt−1, yt−2, . . .), (ii) μS t ∈ {μ1, μ2}
and σS t ∈ {σ1, σ2} are determined by the state in period t, (iii)
μ2  μ1, and (iv) the autoregressive coeﬃcients φ1, φ2, . . . , φk
are restricted so that the roots of the associated lag polynomial,
φ(L) ≡ 1− φ1L− φ2L2 − · · · − φkLk, lie outside the complex unit
circle.
We let the idea that S t = 2 entails higher activity impose the
normalization μ2  μ1, while σ1 and σ2 are left unrestricted
(except for the obvious nonnegativity requirement). Further-
more, the familiar condition on the autoregressive parameters
φ1, φ2, . . . , φk ensures that the process is in some sense mean
reverting, where this mean however depends on the state se-
quence.14
Specification (2) diﬀers in a small but important way from
Hamilton’s (1989) original specification,
yt − μS t =
k∑
i=1
φi(yt−i − μS t−i ) + εt, (3)
which has been the workhorse model in the literature on mean
and variance switching Markov models and also happens to be
12A convenient way to think of the ergodic probabilities is in terms of the
fraction of high and low states observed in an infinitely long realization of the
Markov chain.
13A previous study by Shughart and Tollison (1984) reports little success
in describing waves in merger activity as a standard autoregressive process
with constant mean and variance, yt − μ = ∑ki=1 φi(yt−i − μ) + εt with εt ∼
i.i.d. N(0, σ2), where the wave property would be reflected solely by some of
the higher-order autoregressive coeﬃcients φ2, . . . , φk being nonzero. How-
ever, such a specification can produce only rather ‘tame’, linear wave-like os-
cillations, while we suspect that the large bursts of activity separated by long
intervals of low activity identified in the aforementioned literature can only be
reconciled with a nonlinear model such as ours.
14The literature has also proposed non-mean reverting processes such as
random walks to describe merger activity (see e.g. Chowdhury, 1993). Even
though standard tests reject the unit root hypothesis for our UK merger series,
this is indeed not the case for the US series. However, it is a well understood
fact that in general, unit-root tests have very little power over Markov-switching
alternatives (see e.g. Nelson et al., 2001), so that such tests do not invalidate our
proposed model. Furthermore, if we perform the unit root tests using only US
data prior to 1995:III (which amounts to discarding little more than a quarter of
the data), the unit root hypothesis is clearly rejected. We take this as evidence
favoring our Markov-switching model over the random walk hypothesis.
the model used by Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) to
describe mergers in particular. The subtle but important dif-
ference is that specification (2) assumes ‘sluggish’ adjustments
of the merger series to a state switch, whereas by specification
(3), state switches cause an immediate full shift in activity. To
see this, observe that in specification (2), what systematically
aﬀects today’s deviation from the mean, yt − μS t , is a weighted
sum of past deviations from the current mean, yt−i−μS t , whereas
in specification (3), today’s deviation is determined by past de-
viations from the contemporaneous mean, yt−i −μS t−i . Thus, the
two models imply rather diﬀerent dynamic consequences of a
shift in regime. This is most eﬀectively illustrated by setting
k = 1 in both (2) and (3) above and considering a permanent
shift from state 1 to state 2 between dates t and t + 1. Accord-
ing to specification (3), the switch to state 2 at date t raises the
value of any subsequent yt+ j ( j  0) by μ2 − μ1 over its respec-
tive value if no state-switch had occurred. In model (2), on the
other hand, the impact of the state switch at t only raises subse-
quent yt+ j by (1−φ j1)(μ2−μ1)  μ2−μ1 for any j  0.15 Hence,
model (3) suggests that the merger series immediately jumps
toward the new mean after a state switch, whereas model (2)
describes a more gradual, ‘sluggish’ gravitation toward the new
mean. Note however that the diﬀerence of the state switch’s
impact between the models disappears as j rises, so that the
models diﬀer most markedly during the adjustment period.
We favor specification (2) over (3) for two somewhat in-
terrelated reasons. First, casual inspection of real merger data
suggests that the transition to a significantly higher (or lower)
level of merger activity is indeed sluggish rather than immedi-
ate. Second, perhaps contrary to other common applications of
mean switching models, there seems to be no intuitive reason
to suggest that the merger process does not display the same
amount of inertia when switching to a high or low activity state
as within a given state. Indeed, if for instance we suspect the
sluggishness in merger series to be a consequence of the fact
that real world mergers may take considerable time to process
(due to preparation, approval, etc.), thereby causing sluggish
adjustment to any unobserved structural shocks, then this slug-
gishness should persist also when the economy moves to a gen-
erally higher or lower level of activity (i.e. when it is hit by a
‘large’ shock).16 For these reasons, we shall employ specifica-
tion (2) for the remainder of our analysis.17
As a final remark, we should point out that more generally,
mean and variance switching is not the only way in which high
and low activity states may be thought to aﬀect mergers. For
instance, an alternative specification might have states impact
only the growth rate rather than the mean level of the merger
15Recall that in an AR(1) model, |φ1 | < 1 by the restriction on the autore-
gressive coeﬃcients in Assumption 3.
16This argument can be formalized by noting that specification (2) can be
interpreted as a standard AR(k) model where the state only aﬀects the dis-
tribution of the error term. This can be seen by rewriting model (2) as
yt =
∑k
i=1 φiyt−i + ε˜t , ε˜t ∼ N(μ˜S t , σ2S t ), where μ˜S t =
(
1 −∑ki=1 φi)μS t .
17A nice technical side-eﬀect of using specification (2) is that inference on
states does not involve an approximation (see e.g. Kim and Nelson, 1999,
pp. 68–70).
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series.18 However, we view the mean-switching specification
as closest in spirit to the wave notion developed in the litera-
ture. What may nonetheless seem somewhat extreme at first
sight is that our mean switching model appears to posit that
waves always have the same magnitude (or, stated diﬀerently,
the described ‘bursts of activity’ always have the same mag-
nitude).19 However, we would like to argue that empirically, a
major task in identifying waves is being able to tell actual waves
from smaller ‘ripples’, and a straightforward way to accomplish
this is to posit that waves always have a certain height. We will
return to this point in our discussion of the 80s merger wave in
Section 6.3.
5. Estimation Techniques
We estimate the model parameters and the path of the latent
Markov switching regime indicator within a Bayesian frame-
work employing Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation meth-
ods. Letting β ≡ (μ1, μ2, σ1, σ2, φ1, φ2, . . . , φk, p, q) denote the
model’s parameters, letting YT = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ) denote the
data observed, and letting ST ≡ (S 1, S 2, . . . , S T ) denote the un-
observed sequence of states, Bayesian inference in our model
takes the form of using the data YT and the model specified
in Section 4 to map a given prior distribution of parameters,
p(β), into a joint posterior distribution of states and parameters,
p(ST ,β|YT ).
Rather than investigating p(ST ,β|YT ) analytically, Markov
chain Monte Carlo methods provide a simple way of simulat-
ing draws from this distribution. We use a particular form of
these methods, the Gibbs sampling technique, which is an it-
erative scheme based on simulating successive draws from the
conditional posterior distributions of the state vector ST and the
appropriately partitioned parameter vector β:
(i) p(ST |β,YT )
(ii) p(p|μ,σ,φ,ST ,YT )
(iii) p(μ|σ,φ,p,ST ,YT )
(iv) p(σ|μ,φ,p,ST ,YT )
(v) p(φ|μ,σ,p,ST ,YT ),
where μ ≡ (μ1, μ2), σ ≡ (σ1, σ2), φ ≡ (φ1, φ2, . . . , φk), and
p ≡ (p11, p22).20
In contrast to the full posterior p(ST ,β|YT ), each of the
marginal posterior distributions (i)–(v) can be handled analyt-
ically. Simulated draws from (i)–(v) are thus easily obtained,
18For instance, Owen (2004) pursues such an idea for UK mergers by fitting
a three-state mean switching Markov model to the diﬀerenced level data Δyt ≡
yt − yt−1.
19Note that in our model with sluggish adjustment to the mean, this is only
strictly true in expectation for waves having the same duration. If the process
is sluggish, then the shorter a wave, the lower its peak.
20For a general introduction to Gibbs sampling, readers are referred to Ge-
man and Geman (1984) and Gelfand and Smith (1990). A textbook treatment
of the method can also be found in Kim and Nelson (1999).
and the Gibbs sampler provides a way of iterating on such draws
to simulate draws from the full posterior p(ST ,β|YT ).21
Given the tool to generate representative sets of draws from
p(ST ,β|YT ), properties of this distribution such as individual
parameters’ marginal distributions and moments are easily char-
acterized by use of their sample equivalents. To address the
central issue of wave identification, we will be particularly in-
terested in Pr(S t = 2|YT ), the posterior probability of being in a
high merger activity state at any date t. These probabilities are
obtained by averaging across the simulated paths for the states,
each simulated while cycling through the above posterior dis-
tributions.
Basing state inference on Pr(S t = 2|YT ), while natural in
the Bayesian framework of Gibbs Sampling, elegantly over-
comes a potential pitfall to classical inference. In a classical
setting, inference on states would typically be obtained through
a two-step procedure by first obtaining a Maximum Likelihood
parameter estimate ˆβ, and then calculating Pr(S t = 2|YT , ˆβ),
the probability of S t = 2 in any period t under the assump-
tion that ˆβ corresponds to the true parameter values.22 From
a Bayesian perspective, the derived inference on states is thus
to be read as contingent on the econometrician having full con-
fidence in his parameter estimate ˆβ. But only rarely will this
correspond to the econometrician’s true confidence in ˆβ. More-
over, alternative conceivable values of β will typically lead to
diﬀerent values of Pr(S t = 2|YT ,β), so that uncertainty about
β will feed into uncertainty on states. As a result, basing state
inference on Pr(S t = 2|YT , ˆβ) rather than on Pr(S t = 2|YT ) can
convey a false degree of certainty about states by neglecting
uncertainty about parameters.
To make this important point more transparent, note that
Pr(S t = 2|YT ) and Pr(S t = 2|YT , ˆβ) are related by
Pr(S t = 2|YT ) =
∫
β
Pr(S t = 2|YT ;β)p(β|YT )dβ, (4)
where p(β|YT ) denotes the posterior density of the parameter
vector. By (4), our Bayesian inference based on Pr(S t = 2|YT )
can be interpreted as considering Pr(S t = 2|YT ;β) for any con-
ceivable parameter constellation β—that is, for the maximum
likelihood estimate ˆβ in particular, but also for any other con-
ceivable β—, weighting it with the respective posterior proba-
bility of β, and adding up across β to produce Pr(S t = 2|YT ).
It is straightforward to see from (4) that if posterior parameter
uncertainty is suﬃciently high and conditional inference on S t
is suﬃciently sensitive to β, then Pr(S t = 2|YT , ˆβ) can diﬀer
substantially from Pr(S t = 2|YT ).23 We will provide a strong
21The derivation of the marginal posteriors is standard (cf. Albert and Chib,
1993; Kim and Nelson, 1999). In particular, the derivation of the marginal pos-
teriors on states in step (i) uses Hamilton’s (1989) filter—an iterative scheme for
calculating the marginal probabilities p(S t |y1, . . . , yt ,β). These filtered proba-
bilities in turn may be used to compactly formulate the likelihood function in
terms of a telescoping product in lieu of brute-force summation over all 2T
possible state sequences. See Kim and Nelson (1999) for details.
22For details on standard maximum likelihood methods, refer to Hamilton
(1989, 1993).
23See Ga¨rtner (2007) for a simple stylized example illustrating this point.
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illustration of this diﬀerence below, where we shall in fact ar-
gue that this methodological point is likely to have played a
substantial role in previous identifications of a 1980s merger
wave.
6. Estimation Results
This section reports the results of fitting our lagged mean
and variance switching model as given by Assumptions 1–3 to
US and UK log merger series.24 In a first step, Section 6.1 an-
alyzes the entire quarterly US merger series from 1973 through
2003. Its main finding, the identification of a wave beginning
in the mid 1990s, is augmented by a look at industry level data
in Section 6.2. In a second step, to investigate the lack of evi-
dence for a discrete 1980s merger wave in more detail, Section
6.3 reestimates the model using only data up to 1995. Section
6.4 argues that in so doing, the estimation techniques described
in Section 5 play a decisive role. Finally, Section 6.5 oﬀers a
shift of focus to the UK by fitting the model to the quarterly UK
merger series spanning 1969 through 2003.
As outlined, inference is conducted in a Bayesian context
using the Gibbs sampling method to derive posterior distribu-
tions of the model parameters and to assess the sequence of un-
observed states. In all cases, Gibbs sampling involved 20,000
iterations, where a burn-in sequence consisting of the first 1,000
draws was discarded prior to any inference. Output of the sam-
pler was closely monitored to ensure proper convergence of the
filter.
6.1. The Tidal Wave of the Mid 1990s:
US Mergers, Full Series 1973:I through 2003:IV
First, we consider the full series of US mergers over the
entire available time span from 1973:I through 2003:IV, as pre-
sented in Figure 1. Preliminary estimation of the model with
various lag lengths k suggested setting k = 4.25
For all model parameters, Table 1 gives summary statis-
tics both on the priors used and on the marginal posterior dis-
tributions obtained. The priors on all parameters where cho-
sen to be relatively uninformative within the class of admissi-
ble conjugate priors (which are: normal distributions for the
parameters μS t and φi, inverted gamma distributions for σ2S t ,
and beta distributions for p11 and p22). To give an impres-
sion of the posterior parameter distributions beyond the mere
24The main reason for using log rather than level merger data is that all series
considered are nonnegative by construction. Strictly speaking, the model as de-
fined by (1) and (2) therefore provides no valid description of the level series
due to its capability of producing negative observations. However, all subse-
quent inference was nonetheless also conducted after fitting the level merger
data to the model. Qualitative results, specifically concerning inference on
states, diﬀer only little from those obtained for the log merger series. Any
remaining noteworthy diﬀerences are explicitly pointed out in the subsequent
discussion.
25More specifically, starting from k = 10, the number of lags was reduced
until the 90% posterior probability band on the highest-order autocorrelating
coeﬃcient did not contain zero. Estimation results for various lag lengths
also showed, however, that state-inference is little aﬀected by the choice of
lag length.
priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
μ1 6.7 1000.00 6.386 6.390 0.083 ( 6.204, 6.538) 6.3959
μ2 6.7 1000.00 7.687 7.677 0.103 ( 7.510, 7.924) 7.6653
σ1 0.2 0.28 0.137 0.136 0.008 ( 0.123, 0.153) 0.1320
σ2 0.2 0.28 0.096 0.095 0.010 ( 0.079, 0.118) 0.0834
φ1 0.0 1.00 0.683 0.683 0.098 ( 0.488, 0.874) 0.6578
φ2 0.0 1.00 0.063 0.063 0.113 (−0.159, 0.287) 0.0538
φ3 0.0 1.00 −0.114 −0.114 0.112 (−0.334, 0.103) −0.1136
φ4 0.0 1.00 0.146 0.145 0.085 (−0.021, 0.313) 0.1386
p11 0.9 0.21 0.987 0.991 0.012 ( 0.955, 1.000) 0.9886
p22 0.9 0.21 0.997 1.000 0.010 ( 0.969, 1.000) 1.0000
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through
20,000 used for inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 1: Estimation Results for US Merger Activity, 1973:I through 2003:IV.
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Figure 2: Marginal Posterior Distributions of Parameters for US Log Merger
Series 1973:I–2003:IV.
summary statistics, Figure 2 plots histograms representing the
estimated marginal posterior distributions of the parameters.
Despite our focus on Bayesian inference, Table 1 also gives
maximum-likelihood point estimates of all parameters in the
last column.
The first feature obvious from Table 1 is that the data in-
deed leads to significant updates in the priors on all parameters,
as shown by direct comparison of the standard deviations of pri-
ors and posteriors. Furthermore, Figure 2 reveals that the cor-
responding marginal posterior distributions are single peaked
and well behaved. As may have been expected from a glance at
the original data, comparing the posteriors for μ1 and μ2 reveals
that mean log merger activity in the high state 2 significantly
exceeds that in the low state 1.
Although not literally interpretable as state-contingent means
of the untransformed series due to the nonlinear log transforma-
tion, the median values of exp(μ1) and exp(μ2) suggest that in
level terms, merger activity in the low and high activity state are
in the region of 596 and 2,160 mergers per quarter, respectively.
Furthermore, log mergers seem to be significantly less volatile
in the high activity state, as shown by a comparison of the pos-
teriors on σ1 and σ2. Again however, caution is called for
when drawing conclusions concerning the volatility of the level
merger series, as the log transformation compresses diﬀerences
at higher absolute levels of activity. Indeed, fitting the model
to the level merger data suggests that in level terms, mergers
are significantly more volatile in the high-activity state. Next,
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Figure 3: Estimated Probability of Being in State of High Merger Activity, US
Log Merger Series 1973:I–2003:IV (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log
Merger Series).
estimates on the autoregressive coeﬃcients φi show that merg-
ers display a considerable degree of inertia also within states.
Moreover, mean and median of the largest root across samples
both figure at 0.84, suggesting a significant degree of inertia in
the merger series. Finally, the posteriors on the transition prob-
abilities p11 and p22 let us conclude that switches in regime are
rather unlikely. Specifically, the median expected duration of
a low activity state, p11/(1 − p11) is approximately 27 years
(mean expected duration is heavily influenced by the skewness
in the posterior on p22 and lies around 133 years). Conversely,
estimates on p22 show that the high activity state seems to be
essentially absorbing, so that a regime of high merger activ-
ity is unlikely ever to be left again—this result being driven,
of course, by the fact that there does not seem to have been a
single reversion from high to low activity in the series so far.
Finally, for the ergodic probability of being in a high state (un-
conditional on the data), Pr(S t = 2) = (1− p22)/(2− p11 − p22),
the mean posterior is 86.5%, whereas the median is 99.7%.
With these results on the model’s parameters in mind, let us
now return to our main objective, the identification of waves in
mergers. Figure 3 plots the probability of being in a high state in
any period t given the observed US merger data, Pr(S t = 2|YT ).
This probability plot is shown in the top panel of Figure 3,
whereas the bottom panel reproduces the underlying log merger
series (along with the posterior median of μ1 and μ2 as dashed
horizontal lines) for convenience. To highlight the most likely
state for any period t, periods for which Pr(S t = 2|YT ) > 0.5
are shaded. However, any interpretation of this ‘best guess’
should take account of the underlying value of Pr(S t = 2|YT )
as a straightforward measure of confidence in this guess: The
closer Pr(S t = 2|YT ) to 0.5, the more uncertainty surrounds the
best guess.
Figure 3 shows that our estimation produces strikingly clear
inference concerning the unobserved state. First, we find com-
pelling evidence that over the entire period between 1973 and
2003, US merger activity has in fact experienced only a single
regime switch, that switch being from low to high activity. Cast
into the wave terminology, this suggests that since 1973, the
US has so far witnessed only the beginning of a single ‘tidal
wave’ in merger activity. Second, while this observation alone
may come as no major surprise given a glance at the log merger
plot, the clear-cut jump in the probability plot also allows us to
date the beginning of this tidal wave rather precisely. Specifi-
cally, the assessed probability of a high state of merger activity
jumps from 0.189 in 1995:II and 0.375 in 1995:III to a value of
0.920 in 1995:IV. We may thus conclude that this wave in US
merger activity is very likely to have been triggered between
the third and fourth quarter of 1995.26
Rounding up, we should stress three points relevant to the
interpretation of these results. First, as pointed out in Section 5,
using Pr(S t = 2|YT )—rather than Pr(S t = 2|YT , ˆβ) for a point
estimate of the parameters ˆβ—means taking account of uncer-
tainty about the model’s structural parameters for the inference
on states. It is all the more noteworthy that Figure 3 conveys
an appreciably clear message concerning the likely sequence
of states. Second, although we shall more thoroughly investi-
gate the failure to identify the hump in merger activity around
the mid 1980s as a discrete wave in a moment in Section 6.3,
let us note for now that this result is even more clear-cut when
fitting the state-switching model to the level rather than the log-
merger data. Intuitively, this is due to the simple fact that the
log transformation exaggerates the mid 1980s hump in merger
activity relative to the level data. Finally, we should point out
our estimation procedure’s weakness in producing inference on
states at the very beginning of the series: For technical reasons,
inference on states actually begins only in 1974:I (rather than
in 1973:I), and inference on states in these early periods is gen-
erally somewhat sensitive to starting values used.27
6.2. Reflections of the US 1990s Wave at the Industry Level
As a prominent explanation of the clustering of merger ac-
tivity in time, the literature has advanced the idea that surges
in aggregate merger activity represent firms’ optimal responses
26Specifically, the probability of the US having witnessed a single state
switch from low to high between 1995:III and 1995:IV (rather than at any other
date) can be calculated at 54.2%, which is contrasted by the probability of a cor-
responding single switch one quarter earlier (i.e. between 1995:II and 1995:III)
of 18.5%, of 3.7% two quarters earlier, and 7.5% one quarter later.
27To understand the first point, note that our estimation of an AR(k) model
takes the first k observations of yt as exogenously given, which is why infer-
ence on states begins in 1974:I. Concerning the second point, inferring states
by means of the Hamilton filter requires specifying the initial exogenous proba-
bility of being in a high activity state, Pr(S 0 = 2|β; y−k+1, . . . , y0). All inference
shown was produced using an uninformative but nonetheless somewhat arbi-
trary initial probability of 0.5. However, simulations with alternative initial
probabilities were run to check the results for robustness. Specifically, for the
full US merger series considered here, results turn out to be very robust despite
the relatively high level of merger activity at the very beginning of the series.
Intuitively, this stems from the fact that, even though the data suggest that the
US may have been in a high level of merger activity immediately prior to 1973,
the strong downward trend at the beginning of the sampling period clearly leads
us to conclude that the US economy must nevertheless have already found it-
self in a low state of merger activity at the time our inference on states begins.
More specifically, for an initial prior probability of 0.5, the posterior probability
of the US economy having starting out in a low-activity state is 0.997.
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Figure 4: Annual US Industry Level Merger Activity, 1990 through 2003
(Source: Mergerstat Review).
to industry-level shocks.28 According to this hypothesis, waves
in merger activity at the aggregate level will be the result of
temporary surges in merger activity in one or a few industries.
Concerning our above findings, this naturally raises the ques-
tion of whether the marked increase in US merger activity in
the mid 1990s was dominated by any specific industries. While
the available data do not permit us to estimate our model at the
industry level, casual investigation of annual industry level data
suggests that the mid 1990s wave is hardly attributable to one
or a few industries alone.
To this end, of the 50 industries identified by the Mergerstat
Review, Figure 4 plots annual merger data for those eleven US
industries with the strongest merger activity between 1990 and
2003, where industries were ranked according to overall activ-
ity (in terms of numbers of mergers) for that period. While Fig-
ure 4 shows that industries were certainly not uniformly hit by
a wave in 1995, it is nevertheless apparent that the resulting ag-
gregate wave is anything but the result of a single industry level
burst. For instance, the largest industry level share in overall
annual merger activity was in Computer Software, Supplies and
Services at its pronounced peak in 2000, with a share of 26%.
Although significant, such shares still make it impossible to ex-
plain the pronounced jump in aggregate mergers—from around
600 per quarter before the wave to over 2,000 thereafter—as
caused only by a small subset of industries. Furthermore, as the
bottom right plot in Figure 4 shows, even after removing the 11
most active industries (which account for 52% to 66% of an-
nual merger activity between 1990 and 2003), residual merger
activity still gives a strong impression of a mid 1990s merger
wave.
6.3. What ever happened to the 1980s Merger Wave?
US Mergers 1973:I through 1995:III
One of the most striking findings in Section 6.1 has been our
failure to identify a regime-switch around the time of the much-
discussed 1980s merger wave. Indeed, a simple look at the log
merger series depicted in Figure 3 may indeed raise questions
28See for instance Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Mulherin and Boone
(2000), Andrade et al. (2001), and Harford (2005).
priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
μ1 6.4 1000.00 5.804 6.274 1.179 (2.467, 6.451) 6.3129
μ2 6.4 1000.00 6.604 6.588 0.206 (6.323, 7.037) 6.7007
σ1 0.1 0.14 0.125 0.128 0.036 (0.053, 0.200) 0.1222
σ2 0.1 0.14 0.105 0.105 0.030 (0.055, 0.161) 0.0753
φ1 0.0 1.00 0.704 0.728 0.136 (0.399, 0.932) 0.4655
p11 0.9 0.21 0.736 0.890 0.292 (0.078, 1.000) 0.9495
p22 0.9 0.21 0.793 0.907 0.252 (0.115, 1.000) 0.8518
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through
20,000 used for inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 2: Estimation Results for US Merger Activity, 1973:I through 1995:III.
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Figure 5: Estimated Probability of Being in State of High Merger Activity, US
Log Merger Series 1973:I–1995:III (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log
Merger Series).
about there being something less pronounced—but nonetheless
‘wave-like’—about the visible hump in merger activity in the
mid 1980s.
As pointed out previously, an arguably rather strong as-
sumption implicit in our two-state model is that waves always
come in similar sizes (where ‘size’ refers to a wave’s peak height).
Along these lines, a perfectly valid reservation with our result
might be that, even if US merger activity between 1973 and
2003 was dominated by a single gigantic tidal wave in the mid
1990s, the assumption of similarly-sized waves downplays the
importance of underlying, less gigantic, but nonetheless signif-
icant and perhaps more regular wave-like merger activity.
As a straightforward way to investigate this possibility, this
section presents estimates for the two-state model using only
the data prior to the estimated break date which started the tidal
wave, i.e. from 1973:I through 1995:III. Note that this corre-
sponds to discarding little more than a quarter of the full series,
which should leave us with suﬃcient data points to identify
waves. Table 2 gives the parameter estimates resulting from
fitting an AR(1) model. Comparison with estimation results
from the full series in Table 1 shows that parameter inference
is rather imprecise for the subsample. Figure 5 again shows the
inferred probabilities of being in a high activity state for this
particular subsample period. By comparison with the clear-cut
result presented in Figure 3 for the entire sample period, Fig-
9
ure 5 suggests that a regime switch is rather hard to identify
in the merger data up to 1995:III. Although the plot does in-
deed hint at a somewhat increased probability of a high activity
state around the mid 1980s (as well as around the mid 1990s
as a warm-up to the ensuing large wave), this hint remains very
faint due to the fact that, except for a short period around 1987,
the probability of a high activity state stays in a rather tight band
around 0.5. Overall, the fact that the inferred probability of a
high activity state, Pr(S t = 2|YT ), stays far clear of either 0 or
1 implies that the data reaches no clear conclusion concerning
a likely sequence of states.29
This indecision in state inference is a first clear indication
that the US has not witnessed a discrete shift in the mean level
of merger activity at all during the 1980s.30 A second striking
feature of the probability plot in Figure 5 is its strong qualita-
tive similarity with the underlying time series of log mergers,
reproduced in the bottom panel of Figure 5. Indeed, the high-
activity estimate in the top panel comes quite close to represent-
ing a positive aﬃne transformation of the log merger series in
the bottom panel. This is something we should expect to see
from fitting a regime switching model to a series generated by
a process with no actual switch in regime. Third, Albert and
Chib (1993) point out that fitting a Markov switching model to
non-switching data results in rather large posterior bands on pa-
rameters, particularly concerning the means μ1 and μ2 and the
transition probabilities p11 and p22, which is reflected in our re-
sults. Finally and perhaps most importantly, inference runs with
simulated data show the posterior distributions of μ2−μ1 for our
US subsample to be quite comparable to the posterior distribu-
tions of μ2 − μ1 resulting from simulated series with similar
but constant model parameter values (i.e. a series with no state
switch).
In sum, therefore, we find little evidence in support of the
notion of a discrete 1980s merger wave even in the truncated
series. It is important however to be clear about the exact mean-
ing of this result, as it does not contradict of course the 1980s
having witnessed somewhat increased merger activity. What
our result fleshes out is that this increased activity is rather un-
likely to have been associated with a nonlinear shift in regime to
the underlying autoregressive process (i.e. a ‘burst in activity’,
such as the boom following 1995:III). Rather, it appears to be
quite compatible with regular, well-behaved random shocks hit-
ting a stationary linear autoregressive process. This is perhaps
best illustrated by Figure 6, which plots the mean residuals (i.e.
estimates of εt) resulting from the original estimation of the
29An alternative approach would be to extend our two-state model by intro-
ducing a third state, thereby explicitly allowing for both ‘medium’ and ‘high’
waves. However, casual inspection of the series strongly suggests that in such a
three-state model, all quarters following 1995:III would rather clearly be asso-
ciated with the ‘high activity state’, leading to inference on ‘low’ vs. ‘medium’
state comparable to the two-state analysis presented in this section.
30Note that in finite samples, given the dataYT , P(S t = 2|YT ) will of course
generally deviate from 0.5 for any t even if the data were indeed generated by a
stationary autoregressive process with no change in regime (i.e., a process with
μ1 = μ2 and σ1 = σ2) due to remaining posterior uncertainty about the model
parameters. Sample runs of the Gibbs Sampler on simulated data involving no
regime change (and parameter values similar to those inferred for US mergers)
revealed pictures quite similar to Figure 5.
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Figure 6: Mean Residuals (with 95% Posterior Bands) for US Log Merger
Series 1973:I–2003:IV.
model over the full data range from 1973:I through 2003:IV.31
Overall, these residuals appear well-behaved and compatible
with our model assumptions of serial independence and nor-
mality. Nonetheless, one might indeed see the first half of
the 1980s as having been hit by a sequence of slightly above-
average shocks which—amplified by the processes’ strong pos-
itive autocorrelation—have given rise to a period of somewhat
increased merger activity. We argue, however, that this is com-
patible with the usual behavior of a stationary autoregressive
process rather than signifying a non-linear burst such as a dis-
crete switch in mean over that period. In other words, in terms
of our regime switching model of waves, we would like to sug-
gest that the 1980s merger wave symbolized a ‘ripple’ rather
than a real wave.
6.4. Parameter Uncertainty Matters:
(Mis-)identifying the 1980s Wave
The preceding section has thoroughly discussed our find-
ing that, in contrast to the 1990s merger wave, the increased
merger activity in the 1980s constituted no extraordinary burst
in activity. This leaves unexplained, however, why the afore-
mentioned studies by Town (1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997),
both of which similarly fit a two-state mean-switching Markov
model to US merger data, have identified an 1980s merger wave
nonetheless.
Candidate reasons for this diﬀerence are manifold, as the
studies diﬀer in the particular series used, the time span consid-
ered, and details in model specification. As this section argues,
however, the main diﬀerence in our interpretation of the 1980s
merger wave is likely to stem from a more subtle, methodolog-
ical reason: the refined methods of inference oﬀered by the
Gibbs sampling approach.
Recall that by means of this approach, our inference on
regimes as presented in Figures 3 and 5 is based on Pr(S t =
2|YT ). This contrasts with Town’s (1992) and Linn and Zhu’s
(1997) inference based essentially on Pr(S t = 2|YT ; ˆβ), the
likelihood of a high state of merger activity while treating the
underlying model parameters as given by the result of a preced-
ing maximum likelihood estimation. Put diﬀerently, previous
31Recall that in a Bayesian estimation context, we consider posterior (i.e.
‘updated’) distributions of the parameters rather than particular point estimates.
Thus, the resulting residuals themselves are random not only due to uncertainty
about the unobservable state, but also due to posterior parameter uncertainty.
Figure 6 displays both the mean and 95% posterior probability bands for the
residual in any period.
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Figure 7: Probability of Being in High State of Merger Activity, US Log Merger
Series 1973:I–1995:III, Calculated at Maximum Likelihood Parameter Esti-
mates.
studies have asked the following question: Given that we be-
lieve the obtained parameter estimates to correspond to the true
parameter values, what is the likelihood of a high-activity state
in any period? What this question obviously forgets to ask is
just how reliable these parameter estimates actually are. Thus,
if parameter estimates involve a high degree of uncertainty, an-
swers to this question can severely overstate the evidence in
favor of a high state of activity, and this appears to be highly
relevant to the discussion of the 1980s merger wave.
To drive this point home, using our data spanning 1973:I
through 1995:III, we have replicated the procedure in Town
(1992) and Linn and Zhu (1997) by calculating the probabil-
ity of a high activity state while holding the model parameters
fixed at their maximum likelihood estimates reported in Table 2.
Figure 7 plots the results. Clearly, by comparison with Figure
5, neglecting parameter uncertainty both leads to considerably
more clear-cut inference on regimes and accentuates evidence
for a high state of activity in the 1980s. Interestingly, the result-
ing sharp identification of a merger wave lasting from late 1984
to late 1986 is not very far from findings in Town (1992), who
identifies 1986:IV as a period of intense merger activity, and
findings in Linn and Zhu (1997), who identify the ‘mid-to-late
1980s’ as a merger wave.
6.5. But Waves Do Exist: The UK Merger Wave Experience
Next, we inspect the UK merger series, shown in the bot-
tom panel of Figure 1, for its wave-like behavior. Analyzing the
UK series turns out to be rewarding not only from the point of
view of understanding UK merger activity, but also as a more
general validation of our proposed Markov switching merger
model and the wave hypothesis in particular. Indeed, the pre-
ceding analysis of the US merger data may be seen as some-
what disappointing as regards the wave hypothesis: While the
proposed model itself does seem to provide a very good de-
scription of the US data, it does so in a fashion that hardly re-
flects the repeated bursts of activity attributed to mergers by the
literature—namely by identifying only a single switch from low
to high activity around the mid 1990s, but no subsequent rever-
sion to low activity, let alone a second or even a third wave.
Given the limitation of our analysis to the last 30 years of US
merger activity, this finding is of course not an invalidation of
the wave hypothesis per se. However, the idea of a wave-like
process governing US mergers would certainly be reinforced by
observing more complete and possibly repeated wave cycles in
other series such as the UK’s.
priors posteriors ML
mean std mean median std 95%-band MLE
μ1 5.00 1000.00 4.808 4.810 0.054 (4.696, 4.913) 4.8188
μ2 5.00 1000.00 5.838 5.844 0.147 (5.549, 6.123) 5.8625
σ1 0.15 0.21 0.188 0.188 0.010 (0.170, 0.210) 0.1843
σ2 0.15 0.21 0.177 0.174 0.026 (0.134, 0.232) 0.1592
φ1 0.00 1.00 0.431 0.430 0.085 (0.266, 0.602) 0.4067
φ2 0.00 1.00 0.189 0.190 0.076 (0.043, 0.338) 0.1743
p11 0.90 0.21 0.981 0.984 0.015 (0.943, 0.999) 0.9811
p22 0.90 0.21 0.915 0.928 0.059 (0.772, 0.988) 0.9119
Note: Result of 20,000 Gibbs-Sampling iterations, iterations 1,000 through
20,000 used for inference. 95%-band refers to 95% posterior probability bands.
Table 3: Estimation Results for UK Merger Activity, 1969:I through 2003:IV.
To analyze the UK data, we estimate an AR(2)-version of
the model in Section 4. Table 3 reports summary statistics on
both the priors used and on the estimated posterior distributions
of the parameters. As with the full US series, the UK series
permits a significant update on the model parameters’ priors,
shown by the marginal posteriors’ standard deviation and pos-
terior bands. Again, the inferred high activity mean μ2 signifi-
cantly exceeds the low activity mean μ1. Interestingly, the ratio
of high to low activity (in log terms) seems comparable across
the US and the UK, as the high activity mean μ2 exceeds the
low activity mean μ1 by an average (and mean) 20% for both
series.32 Also, shocks to UK mergers again appear to be less
volatile in the high activity state, although this is much less sig-
nificantly so than for the full US series (as would be expected,
fitting the model to the untransformed data reveals much higher
volatility in the high than in the low activity state). The estimate
of φ1 suggests that autocorrelation in the UK series is signifi-
cantly positive and again quite comparable to the degree ob-
served in the US data. Finally, however, the unobserved state is
more likely to change in any period for the UK series, as shown
by the posteriors on p11 and p22. Particularly, for the UK, the
median expected duration of a low activity state is 15.5 years
whereas that of a high activity state is 3.2 years. Concerning
the ergodic probability of being in a high state (unconditional
on the data), Pr(S t = 2), the mean posterior is 21.8%, whereas
the median is 18.0%.
Next, Figure 8 shows the estimated probabilities of being
in a high activity state for the UK merger series. The probabil-
ity plot shows strong evidence that the UK has witnessed two
distinct merger waves between 1969 and 2003. The first wave
seems to have lasted from 1971:I through 1973:IV. Due to the
aforementioned inference problems at the beginning of the se-
ries as well as because the merger series seems somewhat ‘un-
decided’ prior to 1971, we cannot precisely date the beginning
of the first wave. Indeed, our inference leaves open to some
extent whether the UK started oﬀ in a high or low activity state
in 1969.33 It appears quite clear, however, that this first wave
32For an impression of what this means in absolute terms, we note that the
median values of exp(μ1) and exp(μ2) are 123 and 345, respectively. Thus,
mean activity in the high-activity state exceeds that in the low-activity state by
around 180% (the corresponding figure for the US is 260%).
33In fact, by investigating annual data, Hughes (1993, p. 17) argues that
merger activity culminates in twin peaks of activity in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
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Log Merger Series 1969:I–2003:IV (in Top Panel, Bottom Panel displays Log
Merger Series).
found its end in 1973:IV, as Pr(S t = 2|˜yT ) drops from 0.773 in
1973:IV to 0.035 in 1974:I. The second wave in turn is reliably
estimated to have started in 1986:III and ended in 1989:IV (the
probability of a high state jumps from 0.372 in 1986:II to 0.987
in 1986:III and dips from 0.957 in 1989:IV to 0.050 in 1990:I).
7. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to revisit quantitative evi-
dence on the merger wave hypothesis. Using a model of Marko-
vian parameter switching, recent merger data and refined meth-
ods of inference, we have sought to identify and date waves in
merger activity. A key finding has been that, concerning merger
activity in the US and the UK over the past 30 years, the inter-
pretation of merger activity as a mean and variance switching
autoregressive process provides a promising quantitative oper-
ationalization of the wave hypothesis.
Moreover, fitting such a model to the data has produced the
following merger wave chronology: First, since the beginning
of our US series in 1973, the US appear to have witnessed only
the beginning of a single large merger wave, this wave having
been kicked oﬀ between the third and fourth quarter of 1995.
Particularly, as a second major result and in contrast to other
recent empirical work, we find very little evidence for the much
discussed 1980s merger wave—at least in the sense of a discrete
shift in average merger activity. We have argued that there is a
methodological reason for this discrepancy in findings, as less
refined inference methods which neglect parameter uncertainty
are likely to have played a significant role in the econometric
misidentification of 1980s merger activity as a wave. Third,
fitting our model to UK merger activity between 1969 and 2003
clearly identifies two UK merger waves, one in the early 70s
and a second in the late 1980s.
We hope that these findings will serve as a sound basis for
a further discussion and investigation of possible underlying
causes for merger waves. Particularly, the rather precise iden-
tification and precise timing of distinct states of merger activ-
ity based on our Markov-switching model openly calls for an
economic interpretation and explanation of these states. Inves-
tigating one such hypothesis, our brief digression in Section 6.2
concerning industry-level data for the US has argued that, what-
ever the trigger for the US 1990s wave, industries seem to have
been rather uniformly aﬀected by it. Resende (1999), using an
industry-level Markov switching model, reaches a similar con-
clusion concerning UK merger activity. Interestingly, while this
leads us to conclude that nationally, industries in each the US
and the UK seem to have been similarly aﬀected by the ob-
served waves, comparison of our results in Sections 6.1 and 6.5
quickly reveals that there is no sign of a similar ‘coordination
of waves’ across countries over the last 30 years.
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